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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
ANTHONY G. HARRIS, Fecei ver 
of Mobile Insurance Company, 
-vs-
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
IDBERr BRIGGS and INTER-OUNTAIN 
GENERAL AGENCY, INC. , 
Cef endants and 
Fesp:mdents. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 16841 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal of a suit by the statuatory receiver of a 
Texas Insurance Company against Inte.nrountain General Agency, Inc. , agent 
of r.bbil Insurance Canpany and Robert Briggs, a Utah resident as an 
individual. On September 21, 1978, the District Court of Travis County, 
Texas, entered a final judgment against the Defendants Briggs and Inter-
m:n.mtain, jointly and severally for $145,654 .57, plus interest. This 
judgrrent has never been satisfied and the Plaintiff-Receiver sought to 
enforce the Texas judgrrent against the tefendants in the Third District 
Court of Utah. 
- 1 -
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DISPOSITION rn LCWER CDURI:' 
Prior to trial, Plaintiff and D:fendant each moved for 
surnnary judgment, Plaintiff arguing that the Texas judgnent was final 
and was entitled to full faith and credit, and D:fendants arguing 
that the Texas court had not acquired personal jurisdiction over then 
and therefore the judgrrent against them was void and unenforcible. 
On November 15, 1979, the G.--ial a::mrt denied Plaintiff's notion for 
surnnary judgrrent. Because Plaintiff's and D:fendant 's motions addressed 
different issues, a question arose as to whether the D:fendant's 
rrotion had been fully argued. D:fendant' s counsel stipulated that the 
matter could be reconsidered by the trial court and the oourt enter-
tained additional affidavits and argurrent on the issue of whether the 
Texas court had personal jurisdiction over the D:fendants. On November 27, 
1979, the trial oourt ruled that doo process, required the Plaintiff to 
try his claims in Utah, and again granted D:fendant' s rrotion for 
surrrnary judgment. From this judgrrent, Plaintiff appealed. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
D:fendant-Fespondent seeks an affinration of both surmm:y 
judgrrents entered November 15, 1979 and November 27, 1979. 
FACTS 
On May 1, 1972, Interrrountain Gene;ri:al Agency, Inc. (Interrroun-
tain) entered into a general agency agreerrent with Mobil Insurance 
company (~bbil) located in Dallas, Texas. Pursuant to this contract, 
Intermountain became the agent of Mobil and until August of 1975 
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conducted a continuous course of insurance business between Intenrountain 
and M)bil. Intenrountain, directly and through sub-agents solicited, 
sold, and issued insurance p:>licies to Utah residents living in Utah, 
and M)bil issued !;X)licies for insurance. On a regular basis Intenroun-
tain collected and remitted premiurrs to the Texas insurance company. 
The policies were issued in Texas and the records and transactions 
between ~bil and Inte:rnountain were generated and stored in Texas as 
to the insurance company's records and records of the transactions 
were also naintained by Inte:rnountain in Utah. Loss claims were filed 
in Texas where they were reviewed and allcwed or disallcwed. Payments, 
pursuant to contract, were nade in Texas. 
Prior to August, 1975, Mobil beca:rre insolvent and was unable 
to pay a nunber of claims tendered to it. This, in spite of the fact 
that Intennountain had forwarded all required premilUtlS to the company. 
On or about August 21, 1975, delinquency proceedings were carnenced by 
the State of Texas through its insurance commission against M:>bil under 
the Texas Insurance Ccrle. M:>bil was placed in receivership and 
Plaintiff-Appellant Harris was subsequently ap!;X)inted as successor-receivor 
to succeed Herbert Crook who initially instituted these legal proceedings 
in TeXa.s. The thrust of Plaintiff's complai..nt in the Texas litigation 
was that because M:Jbil had gone into receivership and because all of the 
:i;olicies written by M:>bil were no longer being honored by M:>bil, that 
the comnissions received by the D=fendant, Inte.nrountain, were therefore 
uneamed commissions and would have to be returned to Mobil through its 
receiver to be distributed to tbe various insureds. Inte:rnountain's con-
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tention was that the vast majority of these premiums had not been 
received by Intenrountain, but had been received by twenty-three or 
rrore sub-agents of Inte:rnountain who were rrobile horn: dealers in Utah 
and who sold the tnlicies to the various insureds at the ti.Ire of 
the purchase of the rrobile hares. In view of the fact that these 
sub-agents were all residents of Utah, doing business solely and 
exclusively within the State of Utah, and selling insurance to Utah 
residents only, and in vieN of the fact that they had received the 
vast. majority of funds which were now classified as unearned comnissions, 
it would be necessary for Intenrountain to join all of these sub-agents 
as Cross-r:efendants in this action and that this could be best done in 
litigation in Utah and not in Texas. 
On or about August 19 , 19 77, a corrplaint was filed by Plain-
tiff's predecessor as receiver of Mobil against Intenrountain and 
additionally against Defendant Briggs personally, alleging that the 
:cefendants previously had entered into a general agency agreerrent with 
Mobil and making allegations that Cefendants were delinquent in paying 
earned prerni lUTlS and unearned oorrmissions aved to MJbil. The receiver 
sought to reoover those arrounts allegedly owing to the receivership 
and filed his original :t:etition in the 20lst Judicial District Court 
of Travis County, Texas. :cefendant Briggs filed a special app:arance 
and notion to quash on or about August 31, 19 77 appearing pro se. On 
March 22, 1978, the Plaintiff filed his first arrended original t:etition. 
cefendants were served with copies on March 27, 1978 by service upon 
the Texas secretary of State in acrordance with Tex.Fev.Civ.Stat.Ann.Art· 
2031b. 
- 4 -
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'!he Secretary of State for the State of Texas subsequently fonvarded 
copies to the Defendants in Utah.. In March, 1978, Defendants Briggs 
and Intemountain filed an answer in the Texas proceeding preserving 
the special app:arano:. The answer was signed by Briggs personally .. 
Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a brief in op:r;:osition to the special 
appearance of Defendants, and the special appearance was noticed 
for hearing on September 14, 1978. On June 23, 1978, Briggs was deposed 
in Salt ~e City in the Texas action. The deposition was taken at 
the office of Lambertus Jansen, but contrary to the allegations of 
fact in Plaintiff-Appellant' s brief, Mr. Jansen did not appear as 
oounsel for Briggs, but rrerely as an accomrodation to Mr. Briggs and 
to Texas counsel in the matter. Thereafter, on July 18, 1978, notice 
was given to the Defendants by the District Court for Travis County, 
Texas, that hearing on their special appearano: had been set for 
September 14, 1978, at 2:00 p.m. and the trial was set for September 21, 
1978. 
On September 14, 1978, the hearing on the special appearance 
was held. Defendants nade no appearano: at that hearing and subsequently 
rre.de no appearance at the hearing on the trial of the natter. Judgrrent 
was rendered against the Defendants as heretofore stated and this judg-
rrent remains wholly unsatisfied. 
On Janua:cy 29, 1979, Plaintiff filed a canplaintin the District 
Court of Utah, seeking to enforce the Texas judgrrent against the Defen-
dants. Both parties rroved for summary judgnait and refendants ' motion 
for sunmary judgrrent was granted. Subsequently, the Plaintiffs took 
this appeal. 
- 5 -
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POINT I: THE Ul'AH TRIAL COURI' RULED PROPERLY THAT PS A MATrER 
OF LM'V' THE TEXAS JUI:G1ENr WAS N0r ENTITLED TO FULL FAI'IH AND CREDIT; 
THE TEXAS COURI' WPS wrrnour JURISDICTION AND THAT ISSUE WAS PIDPERLY 
ATI'ACKED BY DEFENDANTS• MYI'ION FOR SUMMARY JtJIX;MENT. 
Subpoint A. The Utah Court has the power to look behind 
the issue of jurisdiction even though that has been raised by a notion 
to quash in the foreign jurisdiction. 
It is clearly establiShed that a Court in one state, when 
asked to give effect to the judgnent of a Court in another state, 
may constitutionally inquire into the foreign Court's jurisdiction 
to render the judgment. This logic was clearly followed by the Utah 
Suprerre Court in the case of Chevron Chemical Company vs. M:cham, 550 
P. 2d. 182, (Utah 1976). In that case, the Third District Court 
denied enforcerrent of an Idaho judgment obtained against the Defendant 
Mecham. The Court in affirming the District Court ruling, held that 
an individual who was an officer of a corporation located in Idaho, 
who gave guarantees to a Plaintiff to indemnify it against losses which 
it might incurr on acoounts with the corporation, but who only ire.de 
one trip to Idaho and had no contacts with any customer, supplier or; 
lending institution, and who never asserted a business presenre in 
Idaho was not subject to jurisdiction of Idaho Courts under the Idaho 
Long Ann Statute. In that case, M:cham signed a personal guarantee 
of the loan and mailed that to the Idaho Plaintiff. M:cham, a resident 
- 6 -
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of Utah, was an officer of an Idaho corporation.. The Court noted that 
Mecham had never asserted a business presence in Idaho, had no busines 
address in that state, had no telephone listing in that state, and as 
an individual had rever consunnated a business transaction in Idaho .. 
M=cham nade a si:::ecial appearance in the Idaho proceedings to challenge 
the jurisdiction of that Court, but judgrrent was rendered against him. 
The Utah Suprerre Court in examining the issue stated that, 
"In detellnining whether or not the Court of the forum 
state has jurisdiction, certain standards and guidelines 
have been enunciated by the courts of the various juris-
dictions. Those standards include the following guidelines: 
( 1) The nature and quality of the contacts of the 
forum state; 
(2) Quantity of such contacts; 
(3) Relationship of the cause to the contact; 
(4) Interest of the forun state in providing a forum 
for its residents; 
(5) The convenience of the parties . 
'!hose sane issues were examined by the trial court in this instant 
action, and the Third District Court ruled that the Texas Court did 
not have jurisdiction over the Cefendants and that therefore, the 
judgrrent was not entitled to full faith and credit. 
In examining the facts in the present action, it should be 
noted. that Briggs made only one trip to the State of Texas, not to 
engage in any business, but to tour the new office building of M::>bil. 
Too, that neither Briggs or Intenrountain naintained any business 
presence in Texas; they had no office, no residence, no telephone 
listing. They sold no p::>licies to Texas residents and the only course 
of dealing with any Texas entity was the mailing of premiums and the 
receipt of insurance policies by mail with the Texas corrpany. Nowhere 
in the pleadings or in the affidavits on file in these proceedings is 
- ..., -
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there any showing that ei th.er Briggs or Intemountain did business in 
Texas. Nor did any of the tr ti 
ansac ons engaged in by either Briggs 
or Intemountain involve any Texas residents other than the defaulting 
Texas COI'p)ration. 
The Court is further cited to Com vs. Whi tnore, 9 Utah 2d. 
250, 243 P. 2d 871, {Utah 1959). Therein the Court stated that, 
"TI:ere must be some substantial activity which correlates 
with the purpose to engage in a C'Ourse of business or 
sorre continuity of activity in the state so that deeming 
the defendant to be present therein is founded upon a 
realistic basis, and is not a rrere fiction." 
Clearly, it would 1:e a rrere fiction to conclude that Intenrountain or 
Briggs were conducting any business in Texas when they had no business 
presence there, maintained no office, no telephone listing, and had 
no dehlings with Texas residents. 
In the farrous case of Pennoyer vs. Neff, (1877) 95 U.S. 714, 
24 L.F.d.565, it was established that the due process clause of the 
14th Arrendrrent is violated where a Court renders a personal judgment 
against a non-resident individual Defendant without having jurisdiction 
over him, and that as a matter of due course, it cannot acquire such 
jurisdiction merely by serving process upon him outside the forum or by 
publication. Since Pennoyer vs. Neff, the C'Oncept of state jurisdiction 
over non-residents has been greatly expanded. However the Court should 
look clearly at the direction that the Supreme Court has been expanding 
such jurisdiction. In the leading case of International Shoe Conpany 
vs. Washington (1945) 326 U.S. 310, 90 L.Ed. 95 66 S.Ct. 154, 161 A.L.R. 
105 7, the Supreme Court held that a foreign C'O:rporation which systemati-
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cally and continually employed a force of salesmen, residents of 
the state of forum to canvas orders therein, C'Ould, consistently 
with due process, be sued in the state to recover contributions to 
the state tm.errployment oonpensation fund in respect to their salesrren. 
What·the Plaintiff-Appellant is attempting to do here is to convert 
that rational in the exact OPPJSite direction. If residents of the 
State of Utah had desired to file suit against Mobil in Utah, in 
view of the fact that Mobil had nurrerous insurance policies in effect 
in Utah, sold to them by residents of the State of Utah who were agents 
or sub-agents of a Utah corporation, as is the case here, there would 
be no doubt that M)bil would be subject to the Long Arm Statute juris-
diction and would be required to defend in Utah. However, it is a 
fallacy to conclude therefore, that because Mobil coUld be sued in 
Utah by Utah residents who were holders of Mobil's policies, that 
MJbil therefore can sue in Texas against Utah residents on transactions 
which occurred in Utah and affect Utah residents only. Clearly, Plaintiff-
Appellant is trying to put the cart before the horse by asking this 
Court to approve such a conclusion. 
Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant cites a nurrber of cases in 
support of this position. However, those can be disp:>sed of rather 
sum:narily. Counsel cites Stoll vs. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 59 s.ct. 
134, 83 L.Ed. 104 (1938) . HONever, in that case the first judgment was 
in the Federal Bankruptcy Court, a Court of general jurisdiction and 
the issues involved the suprerna.cy clause and the jurisdiction of federal 
oourts and has nothing to do with full faith and credit. Counsel cites 
- 9 -
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Trinies vs. Sunshine Mining CD., 308 U.S. 66, 60 S.Ct. 44, 84 L.Ed 85 
(1939). However, that was a Federal Court case again which dealt with 
subject natter jurisdiction and not in personam jurisdiction, again 
not applicable to this situation. Counsel further cites Sherrer vs. 
Sherrer 334 U.S. 343, 68 S.Ct. 1087, 92 L.Ed 1429 (1948). In this 
instance the Defendant made a general appearance and not a special 
appearance, and again the facts are not even similar to the fact 
situation which we are dealing with in this case. In Sherrer, the issue 
was whether the Plaintiff had been a resident of the state and county 
long enough to be a resident for jurisdiction in a divorce action. The 
Court found that the Plaintiff had been a resident long enough and the 
Massachusetts CDurt concluded that it oouldn't decide the issue of 
whether the Plaintiff was a resident long enough in view of the fact 
that the local court had reached the conclusion that the Plaintiff had 
been a resident for a substantial period. The fact situations are so 
substantially different as to render Sherrer not renotely applicable. 
CDunsel further cites Raynor vs. Stockton Savings & Loan Bank, 332 P. 2d. 
416, (Cal. 1958), but in that instance there was a general aH_:>earance 
by Defendant, again rendering the case not applicable for precedent in 
this matter. The sane is true of Sanpietro vs. CDllins, 250 Cal.App.2d. 
230 Cal.Rptr 219 (1967), Heuer vs. Heuer, 201 P.2d. 385,(cal.1949). 
CDunsel also cites Davis vs. Davis, 305 U.S. 32 59 s.ct. 3, 83 L.Ed. 26 
(1938) and in the Davis case, there was not only personal service but 
there was a subsequent general appearance. Finally, in Sub-Point A of 
Plaintiff-Appellant's agrurrent, he cites Baldwin vs. Iowa State Travelillg_ 
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~ns Association 283 U.S. 522 51 s.ct. 517 75 L.Ed. 1244 (1930), and 
the ruling in that case was that full faith and credit required by the 
constitution is not involved where neither of the Courts c:oncerned 
was a state court. Cmmsel further relies on Durfey vs. Duke, 375 U.Sc 
106 84 S.Ct. 242 (1963) • This was a Federal Court case that dealt 
with in rem jurisdiction and not in personam jurisdiction. The issue 
was whether once the Nebraska Federal Court had ruled that a piece of 
land was located in Nebraska, whether the Missouri Federal Court coulct 
deteJ::mine whether Nebraska ·had jurisdiction over the land. None of 
these cases cited by Plaintiff-Appellant are in any way similar to 
the circmnstances alleged in these proceedings, and none of them should 
be oonsidered prece::1ent for the type of holding Plaintiff-Appellant 
is requesting herein. 
Sub-Point B: Defendants never waived their special appearance, 
never submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the Court, and there-
fore are entitled to attack that jurisdiction collaterally. 
Contrary to the allegations found in Plaintiff-Appellant's 
brief, conversations held between Plaintiff's Texas c:ounsel and Defen-
dants' Utah counsel, clearly were to the effect that counsel in Texas 
would not hold Briggs or Intemountain to the specific niceties of the 
rules of procedure with regard to swom staterrents, and now Plaintiff's 
Utah counsel is atterrpting to do that. This is grossly tm.fair and 
clearly arcounts to an overreaching on the part of the Plaintiff-Appellant. 
Counsel for Plaintiff cites Brown "VS. Brcwn, 520 s.w. 2d. 571 
(Tex.Civ.App.1975) as precedent for the contention that Briggs and 
Intenrountain by failing to appear at the hearing on their special appear-
ance, waived the special nature of their appearance and this acrounted 
to . ·: ~~;~"y~- · ·= :;reneral jurisdiction. If The Court will 
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examine Brown vs. Brown, they will note substantial differences in 
that action, which was an action for divorce from this present action. 
Cefendant Brown was personally served within the State of Texas and 
wherein he stipulated that in the event he failed to make rronthly 
~ra:ry alirrony payrrents, his special appearance would be converted 
to a general appearance. The Cefendant then failed to nake his 
timely paym:nts and thus there was a stipulation that the D:fendant 
had appeared personally and generally within the State of Texas. Such 
is not the case here; contrary to Plaintiff~Appellant's allegation, 
there is a stipulation that none of the Cefendants' conduct in 
attempting to represent themselves in this action, would constitute 
a waiver of their special appearance. Plaintiff-Ai;:pellant should 
therefore be estopped from alleging any such allegation in the brief 
to this Court. 
In sumrrary therefore, this Court should affirm the findings 
and rulings of the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah by sustaining its ruling in Chevron vs. M:cham and Conn 
vs. Whitm::>re. The Third District Court was clearly within its peroga-
tive to examine the affidavits of the Cefendant and detennine that Texas 
was without jurisdiction to proceed against the Cefendants in Texas 
and that the matter should have been initially prosecuted in Utah. 
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURI' PIDPERLY HELD THAT "N3 A MATIER 
OF I.MV, 'IHE TEXAS COURI' DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION OVER THE DEFENrnNI'S 
AT THE TIME IT ENTERED ITS ~. 
Sub-Point A. The District Court of Texas did not acquire 
personal jurisdiction over the Cefendants under its long Ann Statute. 
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Section Three of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes Annotated, Article 
20 31B, provides that: 
Any foreign o:n:poration or non-resident, natural person, 
that engages in business in the state and does not rraintain 
a place of regular business in the state or a designated 
agent upon whom service may be made upon cause of action 
arising our of such business done in the state, the act 
or acts of engagiig in such business within the state shall 
be deerred equivalent to an appointrrent by such foreign 
co:rporation or non-resident, natural person, of the Secretary 
of State of Texas as its agency "UpOn whom service of process 
rray be made in any action, suit, or proceedings arising 
out of such business done in the state, wherein such cor-
:poration or non-resident, natural person is a party or 
is to be made a party. 
Therefore, service of process upon the Texas Secretary of State is 
proi;:er only where the foreign oorporation or non-resident/natural person, 
satisfied three threshhold requirements: 
(1) That he does not maintain a regular place of business 
in Texas. 
(2) That he is not a designated agent in Texas for serving. 
( 3) He engages in business in Texas. 
Therefore, we get down to the threshhold question! "Did Interm:>untain 
or Briggs do business in Texas?" It is acknowledged that the :cefendants 
did not maintain any regular place of business in Texas and did not 
designate an agent in Texas for service of process. 
Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant claims that all that is necess-
ary to do business in Texas is for an individual to enter into a contract 
by rrail with a resident of Texas to be perforrred in whole or in part 
by either party in Texas. It cites U-Anchor Advertising vs. Burt 553 S .W. 
2d. 760 (Tex. 1977) , in sup:port of this pro:posi tion. Actually U-Anchor 
Advertising is far rrore favorable to the Defendants than it is to the 
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Plaintiff-Appellant. In U-Anchor Advertising a rontract between the 
I:efendant OklahoID3. businessrran and a Texas advertising conpany.was 
solicited by the Texas corrpany in Oklahom3.. The oontract was signed 
in Oklahoma and required the Texas company to place displays in 
Oklahana. The only rontact that the I:efendant had with Texas was 
that he was required to send his payments to the rorrpany's office in 
Amarillo, Texas. When the rontract was breached, the advertising 
rorrpany attempted to sue the I:efendant in Texas. The Texas Suprerre 
Court held that the exercise of Long-Arm jurisdiction would violate 
the Defendant's right to due process of law. 
"In the instant case, the contacts of Burt with Texas are 
minimal and fortuitous, and he cannot be said to have 
purposefully ronducted activities within the state. 
Burt's contacts with Texas were not grounded on any 
e~ctation or necessity of invoking the benefits of 
protections of Texas law, nor were they designed 
to result in profit fran a business transaction under-
taken in Texas. The contract was scDlicited, negotiated, 
and consum:nated in Oklahoma., and Burt did nothing to 
indicate or to support an inference of any purpose to 
exercise the privilege of doing business in Texas. 
Simply stated, Burt was a passive custorrer of a Texas 
COI:poration who neither sought, initiated, or profited 
from his single and fortuitous rontact with Texas." 
In the present case, we have Utah D:fendants who entered into a contract 
with a Texas rorporation, wherein all business transactions were 
conducted in the State of Utah. Defendants sold insurance policies, 
either directly or through sub-agents, to Utah residents, and the only 
contact that the D=fendants had with Texas was that they were required 
to send payrrents to the rompany' s office in Texas. In addition to 
the similarity of circumstances, there is an added feature which 
clearly requires that the original proceedings in this matter be 
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brought in Utah, which were not present in the U-Anchor case. In 
present case, the D:fendant would have cross-claims against twenty-
three (23) or rrore Utah sub-agents for any of the unearned corrmissions 
for Which the Plaintiff is allegedly suing. Those sub-agents are 
all residents of the State of Utah, are all doing business solely in 
the State of Utah, and would not be subject to jurisdiction of the 
Texas Court. 'Ihus, it would be necessary for the D:fendants to file 
twenty-three (23) separate actions in the State of Utah against those 
sub-agents to recover the majority of the funds which Plaintiff claims 
it is entitled to. Thus, where all of the litigation could be cleared 
up in one lawsuit in Utah, had the Plaintiff-Appellant elected to 
sue in Utah, the result if this Court is to affirm the Texas Court's 
jurisdiction in this matter will be to suddenly promulgate twenty-three 
or :m:'.)re additional sui. ts in the State of Utah by the D:fendants-Fesp::>ndents 
against those various sub-agents. 
Sub-Point B. 'Ihe assunption of jurisdiction by the Texas 
Court offends the traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice. 
As previously ~lained, the Texas Suprerre Court in U-Anchor 
looked at the nature and extent of the contacts of the non-resident 
with the forum state to detennine whether the Court could exercise 
jurisdiction over the non-resident. In U-Anchor, the Court concluded 
that there were not such contacts, and this Court can look at the 
affidavits and other docunents on file in these proceedings, and conclude 
as did the Court belcw, that there were not the kinds of contacts with 
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the State of Texas that would give the Texas Court jurisdiction over 
the Defendants herein. Counsel for Plaintiff states, "It would have 
been and would be however inronvenient to require Plaintiff to litigate 
each cause of action against each non-resident insurance agent in their 
resp:ctive states. Not only is it rrore convenient to allow Plaintiff 
to litigate each cause of action in Travis County, Texas, it is also 
rrore equitable to the receivership estate, and as many creditors, 
claimants and individual insureds, includ.ing Utah residents entitled to 
disburserrents from the receivership estate for the nurrerous causes 
of action against non-resident agents to be prosecuted in an efficient 
and economical nianner." Such an allegation is rrerely window dressing. 
Once the Plaintiff-Respondent had filed its lawsuits in Texas and had 
obtained judgment, it is still necessary for him to go to the state 
wherein the individual defendants reside and file subsequent actions, 
such as this one, to enforce those judgrrents. The Plaintiff-Appellant 
has, therefore, doubled the number of lawsuits necessary, by first 
filing nurrerous actions in Texas, and then having obtained judgm:mts, 
filing numerous actions in various other states to enforce those judg-
rrents, when the Plaintiff-Appellant rould have gone directly to the 
state of residence of the individual defendants and filed only one 
lawsuit. To talk in te:r::rns of duplication, waste·.,! and inefficiency, 
being avoided by such a tack, seems totally illogical. It is ll'npossi-
ble for Defendants to see how two lawsuits are better than one. And, 
when we add to that, the number of cross-claims which will of necessity 
have to be filed, they are saying twenty-five lawsuits are better than 
one. How such a theory can avoid waste and duplication totally escai;:es 
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counsel for ~fendants. 
Counsel cites Burt Drilling, Inc. vs. Portadrill, (No. 15709, 
filed March 4, 1980, Utah), in supp.Jrt of his position. In Burt Drill-
ing, Inc. , the Utah corporation was penni tted jurisdiction over a Cali-
fornia corporation with its principal place of business in San Francisco, 
and this Court should look very carefully at that decision and compare 
it with the fact situation in the present case. There, the ~fendants 
delivered drilling equiprrent whi-ch eventually ended up in Utah. They 
sent representatives to examine and repair the machinery when it mal-
functioned in Utah, and sent invoices and price lists to the Plaintiff 
in Utah. Discussing the requirenents of "minimum contacts, the Utah 
Court stated: 
( 1) Defendant purposefully contracted with the resident 
of this state, knowing that it was a resident, and 
(2) ~fendant purposefully undertook to supply goods 
to that resident reasonably kncwing or anticipating 
that those goods would be used in this state. 
This clearly reiterates the position noted by Cotmsel for the ~fendant-
Fest:endents previously, that, were the fact situations changed and, were 
the Defendants suing the Plaintiff in Utah under Utah's Long-Arm Statute 
for breach of contract on all of the insurance policies which were 
written in Utah and which were not honored by Mobil, this Court could 
clearly take jurisdiction over l'bbil; ho.vever, the reverse is not 
nea:ssarily true. True, Intenrountain entered into a oontract with 
M:>bil with all economic benefit derived out of that contract generated 
in Utah and all products, i.e. insurance policies, delivered to residents 
of Utah. It is the residents and the agents and sub-agents located in 
Utah who have been injured by .MJbil 's conduct. If Mobil had conducted 
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its business in a business-like mmner, there would be no litigation. 
It is Mbbil who breached the agreerrent by accepting premiums for 
insurance and then not being in a position to pay claims. Counsel 
for Plaintiff-Appellant has consistently atterrpted to make the 
Defendants wear the black hat in these proceedings, but it should be 
noted that it is the Plaintiff's predecessor 'Who is in default, for 
it is Mobil who becarre insolvent and could not pay cla.irrs, and it is 
the residents of the State of Utah who have been injured. The State 
of Texas has not been injured in.this situation, and the notions 
of fair play and substantial justice require that those individuals 
in Utah who have been injured should have the perogative of choosing 
the fort.ml. 
Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant finally concludes that to 
require the Plaintiff to re-tty the Texas judgment in a Utah Court 
would necessitate the transportation of htmdreds of documents at great 
expense and delay, both for the receiver himself, and for all those, 
including numerous Utah residents, who have filed claims against the 
receivership. Hc:Mever, D:fendants find it difficult to see that as a 
distinction because the D:fendants would be required to travel to Texas 
at great expense, trans};X)rt hundreds of doaments in their possession, 
reach a detennin.ation as to what arnot.mts, if any, are due the receiver, 
and then go back to Utah :and litigate twenty-three or nore causes of 
action against sub-agents in order to obtain the funds to p:ty all of 
these alleged, but tmproved claims. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial oourt ruled properly in refusing to extend full 
faith and credit to the Texas judgrrent and that ruling should be affirmed 
by this Court. The Texas District Court could not properly assurre 
jurisdiction over either of the Cefendants in view of the fact that 
neither of the Defendants ever conducted any business in Texas. The 
rrere fact that there was an agency agreerrent in existence between 
Cefendant Intennountain and lt)bil Insurance Company of Texas wherein 
M:)bil wrote insurance policies in favor of Utah residents insuring 
property located in Utah and Interrrountain submitted premium payrrents 
to MJbil for that insurance and does not constitute Interirountain or 
Briggs as ever having done business in Texas. The record before the 
Court indicates that Defendants maintained no business presence in 
Texas and have never asserted a business presence there. They had no 
business address in Texas , had no telephone listing, and there is no 
shewing that as an individual, Briggs had ever consurmE.ted a business 
transaction in Texas, his only trip to Texas being for the purpose of 
looking at the new office building that Mobil had built as a guest of 
.lt>bil. Defendants were never waived their special appearance, and 
by admission of Counsel for Plaintiff, the Answer filed by the Defendants 
preserved the special appearance, and that special appearance was 
preserved by the Cefendants throughout the proceedings through corrmuni-
cation between Counsel for Plaintiff and Defendants Counsel in Utah. 
Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant in Utah is new attenpting to convert 
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that special appearance into a general appearance solely because 
Plaintiff-Appellant cannot prevail under any other theo:cy. Due 
process requires the Plaintiff-Apr:ellant to litigate its claims in 
Utah, where not only the Cefendants will be present to proceed on 
the basis of its records here in Utah, but will: be enabled to join 
as Cross-Cefendants sorre twenty-three or nore sub-agents who received 
the substantial portion of the carrmissions which Plaintiff-Appellant 
claims are unearned and therefore the property of M:>bil. This Court 
should affinn the ruling of the Third Judicial District Court and 
require Plaintiff-Appellant to litigate its claim against the Utah 
Defendants in Utah and deny Plaintiff-Appellant full faith and credit 
on the Texas judgnent. 
DATED this 
;{fy . 
il/ - day of May, 1980. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITrED, 
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